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Abstract
Control strategies enforced by health agencies are a major type of practice to contain influenza outbreaks. Another type of
practice is the voluntary preventive behavior of individuals, such as receiving vaccination, taking antiviral drugs, and
wearing face masks. These two types of practices take effects concurrently in influenza containment, but little attention has
been paid to their combined effectiveness. This article estimates this combined effectiveness using established simulation
models in the urbanized area of Buffalo, NY, USA. Three control strategies are investigated, including: Targeted Antiviral
Prophylaxis (TAP), workplace/school closure, community travel restriction, as well as the combination of the three. All
control strategies are simulated with and without regard to individual preventive behavior, and the resulting effectiveness
are compared. The simulation outcomes suggest that weaker control strategies could suffice to contain influenza epidemics,
because individuals voluntarily adopt preventive behavior, rendering these weaker strategies more effective than would
otherwise have been expected. The preventive behavior of individuals could save medical resources for control strategies
and avoid unnecessary socio-economic interruptions. This research adds a human behavioral dimension into the simulation
of control strategies and offers new insights into disease containment. Health policy makers are recommended to review
current control strategies and comprehend preventive behavior patterns of local populations before making decisions on
influenza containment.
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Introduction
During the past decade, influenza has obtained unprecedented
attention due to widespread occurrence of novel viruses, such as
the bird flu in 2003 and the swine flu in 2009 [1,2]. Recent
estimates by the Center of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
indicated that the 2009 swine flu is responsible for 274,000
hospitalizations and 12,470 deaths in the United States [3]. These
staggering health burdens call for effective measures to control and
prevent future outbreaks. The control of influenza primarily
involves applying health resources to affected people, known as
control strategies, for example, medical treatment for infected
individuals, closure of affected workplaces/schools, and travel
restriction to affected communities [4]. The prevention of
influenza emphasizes healthy people and depends on their
voluntary behavior against the disease, referred to as the
preventive behavior. As recommended by CDC, the preventive
behavior against influenza include receiving vaccination, wearing
facemasks, washing hands frequently, taking antiviral drugs, and
others [5].
While devising various control strategies and evaluating their
effectiveness, few studies have incorporated the preventive
behavior of individuals [6,7]. In most cases, individuals are often
assumed to passively comply with control strategies, but their
active prevention against the disease has been overlooked. In
reality, the preventive behavior of individuals also reduces
infections and takes effect concurrently with typical control
strategies. For instance, individuals may voluntarily protect
themselves from infection, once they realize some control
strategies being applied to their family members, colleagues, or
communities [8,9,10]. By far, the combined effectiveness of control
strategies and individuals’ preventive behavior remains unclear,
and little attention has been paid to this issue. Lack of such
knowledge may bias estimation of health resources needed to
suppress an outbreak, and mislead the real practice of influenza
containment.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the combined
effectiveness of control strategies and individual preventive
behavior. Agent-based stochastic simulations are used to investi-
gate three control strategies, including the Targeted Antiviral
Prophylaxis (TAP), workplace/school closure, and travel restric-
tion, as well as combinations of all three. The urbanized area of
Buffalo, New York, USA, is taken as a study area. The control
effectiveness with and without considering individual preventive
behavior is compared to indicate if there exists a significant
difference. Cost-effective strategies are suggested based on the
comparison analysis. The remainder of this article is organized as
follows. The method section that follows reviews two established
influenza models for simulation and describes the design of control
strategies being simulated. The result section presents and
compares the simulation results. The discussion section concludes
this article with implications.
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Epidemic models, including mathematical and computer
models, have been extensively used to investigate disease control
strategies, because of their ease and flexibility to deal with different
scenarios. The classic mathematical model, the SIR model, and its
variants employ differential equations to describe continuous
variations between three subpopulations, i.e., the susceptible,
infectious and recovered [11,12]. Various control strategies are
often expressed as different initial conditions (e.g., the size of
susceptible population) or parameter settings (e.g., the infection
rate) of differential equations. The computer-based simulation
models have recently gained their impetus in epidemiology
[13,14,15,16]. These models study population-level health out-
comes through the simulation of individuals and their micro-
interactions. Control strategies can be represented by altering
individuals’ health status and their behavior, such as endowing
them immunity against infection and prohibiting their out-of-
home activities. All of these epidemic models provide solid
platforms to evaluate and compare alternative strategies, thus
informing health policy making [17,18].
Epidemic models with and without individual preventive
behavior
Epidemic models without considering individual preventive
behavior are widely seen in the literature and hereinafter referred
to as ‘influenza-only’ models, because they primarily focus on
influenza transmission. In this research, an influenza-only model
is implemented in the study area, which includes a total number
of 985,001 individuals. These individuals live in 967 census block
groups and 400,870 households according to US census 2000
[19], and carry out daily activities in 36,839 business locations
[20]. The model involves an agent-based stochastic simulation,
discrete time steps, and spatially explicit representation of
individuals. Each individual is a modeling unit with a set of
characteristics (e.g., age, occupation, infection status, location and
time of daily activities) and behaviors (e.g., traveling between
locations for activities and having contact with other individuals)
[21,22]. Individuals and households are simulated under the
constraints of census data so that the modeled population
matches the age and household structure of the real study area.
Individuals are also assigned to business locations to represent
their daily activities, such as working, shopping, eating out, etc.
(Figure S1). The contacts between individuals take place when
individuals meet at the same time and location, such as homes,
workplaces, shops, and restaurants. Because individuals travel
over time and location, their mobility weaves a spatio-temporally
varying contact network (See Text S1 Section 1.1). Through such
a network, influenza viruses diffuse from one individual to
another. Each individual is allowed to take one of four infection
status during a time period, i.e. susceptible, latent, infectious, and
recovered. The progress of infection status follows the natural
history of influenza, including the latent, incubation, and
infectious periods (Table S1). During the infectious period,
individuals may manifest symptoms and become symptomatic.
To initiate the disease transmission, five infectious individuals are
randomly seeded into the study area at the first day of simulation,
which then lasts for 150 days. In each day, the model traces
susceptible contacts of infectious individuals, and stochastically
identifies the next generation of infections using the Monte-Carlo
method (See Text S1 Section 1.2).
In order to further consider individual preventive behavior, this
research employs an agent-based ‘dual-diffusion’ stochastic model
that simulates the concurrent diffusion of both influenza and
individual preventive behavior [23]. The preventive behavior is
considered as a practice or information that also diffuses over
contact networks through inter-personal influence. These two
diffusion processes interact with one another, i.e., the diffusion of
influenza motivates the propagation of preventive behavior, which
in turn limits the influenza diffusion [24,25,26]. In the model, the
diffusion of influenza is simulated similarly to the influenza-only
model aforementioned. The diffusion of individual preventive
behavior is propelled by two types of inter-personal influence
through the contact network: one is the perceived infection risk
and the other is the perceived social standard. The former is
represented as the proportion of influenza cases among an
individual’s contacts, while the latter is expressed as the proportion
of behavioral adopters among the contacts [23]. Individuals are
simulated to evaluate these two proportions every day through the
contact network. Once either proportion exceeds a corresponding
threshold, an individual will be convinced to adopt and practice
preventive behavior [27,28]. The estimation of individualized
thresholds toward adoption is based on a health behavioral survey
approved by the Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional
Review Board, University at Buffalo, State University of New
York. The waiver of informed consent was obtained from the
university review board for this research (See Text S1 Section 2
and Figures S2–S3). Compared to the influenza-only model,
individuals in the dual-diffusion model have additional character-
istics, such as their adoption status of preventive behavior and
thresholds toward adoption. Individuals also have more behaviors,
for example, evaluating infection risks and social standards from
their contacts, making decision to adopt, and carrying out
preventive behavior against influenza. For illustrative purposes,
the use of flu antiviral drugs (e.g., Tamiflu) is taken as an example
of preventive behavior in the simulation, because its clinical
efficacy is more conclusive than other behaviors, for instance,
washing hand and wearing facemasks. Specifically, if an individual
uses antiviral drugs, the chance of being infected and infecting
others can be reduced by 70% and 40%, respectively [14,29].
Implementation details of these two models are not the focus of
this article, and readers could refer to Text S1 Section 1.3 and
Table S2.
Influenza control strategies
Influenza control strategies are mostly applied at three levels:
the individual level, group level, and community level. For each
level, one strategy is selected for subsequent investigation, namely,
a Targeted Antiviral Prophylaxis (TAP) strategy at the individual
level, a workplace closure strategy at the group level, and a travel
restriction strategy at the community level, as shown in Table 1.
Detailed descriptions of the three strategies are provided below.
First, the TAP strategy identifies symptomatic individuals
(influenza cases), searches their household members, and then
targets antiviral drugs to all these individuals [13,30]. This strategy
has been recommended to be quite effective if stockpiles of
antiviral drugs are sufficient and infections can be quickly detected
[4]. To account for limited health personnel, this research assumes
that only a proportion of influenza cases, 60% (60%TAP) and
80% (80%TAP), can be identified during a day, following the
design by Germann et al. [13]. Second, the workplace closure
strategy shuts down a proportion of workplaces/schools where
influenza cases are identified [31]. This strategy has been
suggested to be useful to socially distance individuals, delay the
disease spread, and win time for developing vaccines and antiviral
drugs [32]. Following the work by Ferguson et al. [33], a low-level
scenario (10%WC) closes 10% affected workplaces and 100%
affected schools during a day, while a high-level scenario
Combined Control Effects for Influenza
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schools. Third, the travel restriction strategy aims to reduce the
trips into and out of affected communities [33,34]. Each of the 967
census block groups in the study area is treated as a community.
Following the project by Germann et al. [13], a low-level scenario
(10% TR) restricts 10% trips into and out of all affected
communities, while a high-level scenario prohibits 50% trips
(50% TR). In addition to testing the three control strategies
individually, the combinations of all three are also evaluated. A
low-level combination scenario (referred to as the Combined-Low)
includes all three strategies at their respective low levels. Likewise,
a high-level combination (referred to as Combined-High) contains
all three single strategies at high levels.
The three control strategies and their combinations in Table 1
are simulated by the influenza-only model and the dual-diffusion
model, respectively. Results from the influenza-only model
indicate the effectiveness of control strategies without individual
preventive behavior. Meanwhile, outcomes from the dual-diffusion
model show the combined effectiveness of both control strategies
and individual preventive behavior. These two modeled effective-
ness are compared to a baseline epidemic scenario, which
represents a worst situation of no control strategies and no
preventive behavior. All strategies are assumed to be implemented
at the time when the cumulative number of influenza cases
exceeds 1,000 (1% of the population), and last until the end of the
epidemic. Individuals having or having not adopted preventive
behavior are treated the same by all control strategies, so that the
control effectiveness from two models are comparable.
For each model and each strategy scenario in Table 1, the
simulation is performed 50 realizations to reduce randomness,
resulting in a total of 1,000 realizations (5 strategies62
scenarios62 models650 realizations). Each simulation records
the time and location of every infection event during a 150-day
period. For each strategy scenario, the control effectiveness is
measured by an epidemic curve that depicts the number of daily
new influenza cases from Day 1 to Day 150. The number of daily
new cases is averaged from 50 model realizations, and then plotted
against time to form an averaged epidemic curve (Figure 1).
Associated characteristics of this epidemic curve are also derived,
including an overall attack rate (the percentage of influenza cases
in the population) and epidemic peak time (Table 2). For the ease
of comparison, a relative effectiveness of a control strategy is also
calculated as an index ranging from 0 to 1. The relative
effectiveness is defined as a ratio of the attack rate reduced by a
strategy from the baseline to the baseline attack rate, i.e., (Baseline
attack rate2Attack rate under a strategy)/Baseline attack rate. A
zero value represents the baseline scenario without any control
strategy (the attack rate under non-strategy=the baseline rate),
while a higher value close to 1 indicates that a control strategy
produces a smaller attack rate. An effective strategy is expected to
produce a low epidemic curve, small attack rate, and high relative
effectiveness. In this research, an epidemic is assumed to be
successfully contained, if the overall attack rate is below 5%. This
is because reported influenza epidemics often have a 5% or higher
attack rate [35,36].
The spatial effectiveness of control strategies is also of interest,
and thus a series of infection intensity maps are displayed in
Figure 2. The infection intensity represents the density of total
infections as points occurring within every geographic unit
(50 m650 m) during the entire 150-day epidemic. The intensity
value at each cell location is also the average from 50 model
realizations and is converted to a unit of infections per sq km
2 for
the ease of comparison. An effective strategy is expected to reduce
infection intensity at every location, and meanwhile confine the
spatial extent of affected areas.
Results
Targeted Antiviral Prophylaxis (TAP) strategy at the
individual level
On average, the baseline epidemic scenario (red curves in
Figure 1) causes an 18.6% of the population developing influenza
symptoms (Table 2). The epidemic peaks at Day 77 with
approximately 6,000 new cases occurring at the peak time. The
application of 60% TAP and 80% TAP scenario (blue curves in
Figure 1A–B) significantly reduces the overall attack rate to 6.87%
and 4.74%, respectively. These two TAP scenarios also postpone
the peak time by 5–13 days. Without considering preventive
behavior, the 80% TAP scenario seems effective to contain the
epidemic, because it manages to lessen the overall attack rate
under the 5% epidemic criterion.
By further adding the preventive behavior (hereinafter abbre-
viated as PB), both 60%TAP+PB and 80%TAP+PB scenarios
(green curves in Figure 1A–B) result in even lower attack rates
around 4.3% (Table 2). The epidemic peaks can be limited around
1,000 daily new cases, while the peak time remains similar to the
baseline scenario. This is because the diffusion of preventive
behavior quickly exhausts the pool of susceptible individuals, and
Table 1. Design and simulation of control scenarios.
Epidemic Models
Strategies
Influenza-only model
(without preventive behavior, PB)
Dual-diffusion model
(with preventive behavior)
Baseline scenario No control strategies
No preventive behavior
N/A
#1: TAP Low: 60% cases Low: 60% cases+PB
High: 80% cases High: 80% cases+PB
#2: School/workplace closure (WC) Low: 100% schools+10% workplaces Low: 100% schools+10% workplaces+PB
High:100% schools+33% workplaces High: 100% schools+33% workplaces+PB
#3: Travel restriction (TR) Low: 10% trips Low: 10% trips+PB
High: 50% trips High: 50% trips+PB
#1+#2+#3 Low: combined by all ‘‘lows’’ above Low: combined by all ‘‘lows’’ above+PB
High: combined by all ‘‘highs’’ above High: combined by all ‘‘highs’’ above+PB
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024706.t001
Combined Control Effects for Influenza
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the preventive behavior of individuals is considered, both the 60%
TAP+PB and 80% TAP+PB achieve a similar control effectiveness
(=0.77), leading to mild attack rates that may not qualify as an
epidemic. The 60% TAP, rather than the 80% TAP, would be
sufficient enough to contain the epidemic. Health agencies only
Figure 1. Simulated epidemic curves resulting from control scenarios with/without considering preventive behavior (PB). The curve
depicts the number of daily new influenza cases during the course of an epidemic. (A) 60%TAP; (B) 80% TAP; (C) 10% WC; (D) 33% WC; (E) 10% TR; (F)
50% TR; (G) Combined-Low; (H) Combined-High.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024706.g001
Combined Control Effects for Influenza
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otherwise being expected.
Workplace closure (WC) strategy at the group level
Turning to the workplace closure strategies (blue curve in
Figure 1C), the 10% WC scenario slightly reduces the overall
attack rates to 11.87%, and delays the peak time only a little
(Table 2). In contrast, the 33% WC scenario ((blue curve in
Figure 1D) lessens the attack rate to a much lower level of 4.86%,
and advances the peak time by approximately 1 week. For the
purpose of containing the epidemic, the 33% WC scenario, i.e.,
the closure of 33% affected workplaces, is needed to achieve an
attack rate under 5%.
By further including the individual preventive behavior (green
curves in Figure 1C–D), the 10% WC+PB and 33%WC+PB
scenarios produce a much smaller attack rate of 3.99% and 1.83%,
respectively (Table 2). The time to reach epidemic peaks is shortened
to 61–66 days, roughly 2 weeks earlier than the baseline scenario.
The relative effectiveness of 10% WC scenario is doubled by
considering preventive behavior. A primary reason is that a number
of susceptible individuals voluntary protect themselves from infection.
These individuals, therefore, cannot be infected or infect others at
workplaces and schools, largely limiting the diseasetransmission. The
comparison suggests that given the preventive behavior of individuals
is counted, a 10% workplace closure strategy, instead of the 33% one,
would be adequate to contain an influenza epidemic.
Travel restriction (TR) at the community level
Surprisingly, the 10% TR scenario (Figure 1E) alone causes an
even worse situation than the baseline scenario. The overall attack
rate reaches 20%, and is 1.4% higher than the baseline rate,
leading to a negative effectiveness (=20.07 in Table 2). A possible
reason is that the travel restriction strategy extends the time of
individuals spent at home, thereby intensifying the within-home
transmission. Since only 10% of trips into and out of affected
communities are restricted, the disease can still be easily
transported from one affected community to another through
the 90% unrestricted trips. The epidemic thus develops faster and
affects more individuals. As the travel restriction level elevates to
50% (the 50% TR in Figure 1F), much more trips into and out of
affected communities are restricted. Although the infections at
homes are intensified, most infections can only take place within
communities, instead of between communities. As a result, the
overall attack rate drops to 5.91% and the epidemic peak is greatly
mitigated. Nevertheless, the 50% TR does not suffice to contain
the epidemic, because the attack rate remains above 5%.
The simulation results are distinctly different if adding
individual preventive behavior (green curves in Figure 1E–F).
The 10%TR+PB scenario produces a much better outcome than
that from the 10% TR alone, because the relative effectiveness
jumps from 20.07 to 0.62. The overall attack rate and epidemic
peak size are remarkably reduced, although the attack rate
remains above 5% (Table 2). The 50%TR+PB scenario turns out
to be effective for influenza containment, because the overall
attack rate can be lowered to 1.65%, much less than the 5%
epidemic criterion.
Combined control strategies
The combined strategies (the blue curves in Figure 1G–H)
outperform each of the three single strategies. The total infections
can be contained far below 5% of the population, with a small
peak size under 1,000 cases. Particularly, the Combined-High
scenario is capable of preventing the epidemic, given only 0.68%
of the population being infected (Table 2). Among the three single
strategies, the TAP strategy reduces infections within households,
the workplace closure strategy tends to prevent infections at
Table 2. Control effectiveness of scenarios with/without preventive behavior (PB).
Scenarios Overall attack rate (%) Epidemic peak time (Days) Relative Effectiveness
b
Baseline 18.60 [18.52, 18.74]
a 77 [64, 92] 0.00
60% TAP 6.87 [0.00, 8.89] 90 [3,136] 0.63
80% TAP 4.74 [0.00, 7.49] 82 [3,145] 0.75
60% TAP+PB 4.31 [0.00, 5.20] 71 [3,104] 0.77
80% TAP+PB 4.30 [0.00, 4.96] 76 [5,102] 0.77
10% WC 11.87 [11.36, 11.90] 80 [64,71] 0.36
33% WC 4.86 [0.00, 5.42] 69 [4, 94] 0.74
10% WC+PB 3.95 [0.00, 4.99] 66 [3, 98] 0.79
33% WC+PB 1.83 [0.00, 2.46] 61 [3, 103] 0.90
10% TR 20.00 [19.91,20.11] 74 [64, 85] 20.07
50% TR 5.91 [0.00, 6.61] 65 [6, 89] 0.68
10% TR+PB 7.10 [0.00, 8.70] 67 [3, 97] 0.62
50% TR+PB 1.65 [0.00, 2.11] 60 [3, 89] 0.91
Combined Low 5.00 [4.33, 5.73] 86 [72, 103] 0.73
Combined High 0.72 [0.00, 0.94] 60 [5, 108] 0.96
Combined Low+PB 1.95 [0.32, 2.34] 75 [7, 108] 0.90
Combined High+PB 0.68 [0.00, 0.91] 52 [4, 102] 0.96
aAll measures are the averages of 50 model runs, and 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets.
bRelative effectiveness=(Baseline attack rate- Attack rate under a strategy)/Baseline attack rate.
T-test shows that the relative effectiveness with and without PB is significantly different (p-value=0.043).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024706.t002
Combined Control Effects for Influenza
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sion between communities. These three single strategies work
together as complements, leading to a significant improvement in
control effectiveness (relative effectiveness.0.9). Without consid-
ering preventive behavior, the Combined-High scenario seems
necessary to contain the epidemic, while the Combined-Low
scenario is insufficient. This argument, however, may be changed
by incorporating individual preventive behavior (green curves in
Figure 1G–H). The Combined-Low+PB scenario now is adequate
to reduce the overall attack rate below 5% and thus contain the
epidemic, while the high-level scenario is no longer a necessity.
Spatial effectiveness of control strategies and preventive
behavior
Based on the comparison analysis above, the TAP 60%+PB,
10% WC+PB, 50% TR+PB, and the Combined-Low+PB
scenarios are suggested to be cost-effective in controlling influenza
epidemics. Therefore, their spatial effectiveness is further exam-
ined and compared through infection intensity maps (Figure 2).
For description purposes, the mapped infection intensity is further
categorized into 6 levels, i.e., very low (0–50 infections/km
2), low
(50–100), moderate (100–200), high (200–500), very high (500–
1,000), and extremely high (.1,000).
Figure 2. Intensity maps of cumulative infections for the entire epidemic. (A) Baseline scenario, (B) 60% TAP+PB, (C) 10% WC+PB, (D) 50%
TR+PB, and (E) Combined Low+PB. The color ramp represents the 150-day cumulative number of infections per sq km
2 at a 50 m650 m cell location.
The infection intensity is further categorized into 6 levels, i.e., very low (0–50 infections/km
2), low (50–100), moderate (100–200), high (200–500), very
high (500–1,000), and extremely high (.1,000).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024706.g002
Combined Control Effects for Influenza
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intensity of infections in the central business district of the study area.
The infection intensity decreases in an outward direction to suburbs.
This is because the central business district has the densest residential
population and highly concentrated business locations. Compared to
the baseline map, the 60% TAP+PB scenario (Figure 2B) greatly
reduces the infection intensities all around the study area, although the
central business district retains a high-level intensity. The spatial
effectiveness of 10%WC+PB (Figure 2C) is similar to the 60%
TAP+PB, but moderate infections are more scattered in the suburban
areas. The 50% TR+PB is capable of confining the wide spread of
influenza over the study area (Figure 2D), leaving only a small number
of separated areas with high infection intensity. These hotspots are
most located within CBD, university campuses, and large industrial
plants, where a large number of people work and live. This is probably
because the city-wide travels of individuals are partially prohibited,
and hence disease can only develop locally. Finally, the Combined
low+PB scenario not only reduces the intensity of the infections at all
locations, but also confines spatial extent of disease spread (Figure 2E).
The infections in the central business district are reduced to a
moderate level, while a vast proportion of the study area has only a
small number of infections.
Discussion
In summary, previous studies on influenza containment have only
considered the effectiveness of applying control strategies, while
overlooking the effectiveness from individuals’ preventive behavior.
This research estimates the combined effectiveness of both control
strategies and individual preventive behavior. The results imply that
previous studies on control strategies are incomplete, and the control
effectiveness might be under-estimated. The comparison between
two model results indicates that preventive behavior of individuals
hasanextraeffectiveness,inaddition tothe effectivenessfromtypical
control strategies alone. This extra effectiveness produces an even
smaller attack rate of influenza, lower epidemic peak, and earlier
peak time. By considering the combined effectiveness, the control of
influenza epidemics may not require as much health resources as
estimated in previous studies. For example, the 80% TAP strategy
could be replaced by the 60% one, reducing the burden of local
agencies to prepare health resources. Likewise, the 10% workplace
closure strategy, rather than the 33% strategy, would be sufficient to
control the seasonal influenza epidemic in the study area. Enormous
socio-economic disruptions could be possibly avoided. A low-level
combination of the three strategies is recommended to suppress
influenza epidemic in the study area, while a high-level combination
is no longer a must. Particularly, with the help of individual
preventive behavior, the 50% travel restriction strategy and the low-
level combined strategy can successfully confines the spatial
dispersion of influenza in the study area.
Similar to any modeling analysis, this research has a number of
limitations. First, the simulation models focus on one US
metropolitan area, one influenza virus strain, and one preventive
behavior. It is possible that the model outcomes vary in different
citiesand differentdisease parameters,suchasa pandemicinfluenza
virus. The interpretation of model outcomes should be limited to
seasonal influenza and in the study area. Although the use of
antiviral drugs is taken as an example in this research, the
methodology can be easily extended to other preventive behavior,
such as washing hands and wearing facemasks, once their
preventive efficacy is conclusively quantified. Second, the mass
media also influences people’s decision to adopt preventive
behavior, especially for diseases that are highly infectious or pose
severe health risks, such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS). This research has not modeled the mass media because its
effects on flu-related preventive behavior remain inconclusive. In
addition, the seasonal influenza simulated in this research has a
relatively mild infectivity and limited risks, thus is usually not a focus
of mass media attention. Third, the model assumes that individuals
adopt preventive behavior immediately after the threshold effects
happen. In reality, individuals’ adoption of a behavior may take a
relatively longer period as it may involve a number of psychological
steps [37]. A more sophisticated behavioral approach may improve
the modeling reality, but also increase the complexity of model
structure. A trade-off between model performance and detail levels
is always a challenge for modelers [38]. Ongoing research is
intended to address these limitations and challenges.
Control strategies enforced by health agencies and preventive
behavior voluntarily practiced by the public are two intertwined
componentsofdiseasecontainment.Ignoringeithercomponentmay
prevent us from effectively mitigating burdens of influenza on public
health. It is hard to resist citing and rephrasing the argument by
Funk et al. [26] that ‘‘individual self-initiated behavior can change
the fate of an outbreak, and its combined effectiveness with control
strategies requires proper understanding if we are to fully
comprehend how these control measures work’’. This research
attempts to fuse the human behavioral dimension into the study of
control strategies, and thus offers more comprehensive understand-
ings on disease containment. Health agencies are recommended to
gain prior knowledge about behavioral patterns of local people
before choosing influenza control strategies. The findings of this
research callfora reviewof currentcontrol strategies and re-estimate
the health resources that are necessary to contain epidemics. It is
believed that such a review would shed new insights on improving
control effectiveness for looming influenza pandemics.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 The simulation of contact network. The
assignment of individuals to households, workplaces, service places
and neighbor households based on the attribute and spatial
information of individuals.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Estimated distribution of the threshold of
infection risks by gender. The X axis indicates the proportion
of influenza cases in the contacts of a participant that is needed to
convince the participant to adopt. The Y axis shows the frequency
of such proportion occurring in the survey results.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Estimated threshold distribution of adoption
pressure by gender. The X axis indicates the proportion of
adopters in the contacts of a participant that is needed to convince
the participant to adopt. The Y axis shows the frequency of such
proportion occurring in the survey results.
(TIF)
Table S1 Model parameters for simulating influenza.
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Table S2 Model parameters for simulating preventive
behavior.
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Text S1
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